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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
state of mind. The dissent, on the other hand,
relying on Katz, did not reconcile its position with
Lopez v. United States, where the defendant's
conversation was recorded by an informer rather
than electronically monitored by him, as in White.
Only Justice Brennan regarded Lopez as having
been overruled by Katz-'
Although the holding in United States v. White
may be limited to the narrow proposition that
Katz v. United States is not to be applied retro-
actively, it is likely that the Court's extensive
1 Id. at 755. In his dissent, Mr. Justice Harlan ac-
knowledged that there was little difference in "the ex-
pectations of privacy" of the defendants in Lopez and
White but he nonetheless regarded the continuing vi-
tality of Lopez as not being drawn into question by this
case. Id. at 788 n. 24.
treatment of the fourth amendment issues in that
case will spread considerable confusion in the
lower courts. With the departure of Justices Black
and Harlan from the court, there are presently
three justices in favor of an extension of the Katz
privacy rationale while four are opposed.54 The
question of whether or not an individual, although
speaking in the presence of an informer, has the
right to converse without fear that government
agents are listening in will be left to Justice Black
and Justice Harlan's successors to decide.
14 Justices Douglas, 401 U.S. at 756, Harlan, id. at
768, and Marshall, id. at 795, were joined by Justice
Brennan, id. at 755, on this issue, although Brenan
concurred in the result. Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tices Stewart and Blackmun formed the plurality with
Justice White.
INDIGENT DEFENDANT-STATUTORY FINES
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971)
Last year, in Williams v. Illinois, the Supreme
Court declared that indigents could not be im-
prisoned for periods longer than the maximum
term authorized by statute for an offense because
they were unable to pay a sfatutory fine.i The
Court in Tate v. ShortP ha expanded the Williams
doctrine by holding that an indigent may not be
imprisoned for nonpayment of a fine'for offenses
for which a fine is the sole punishment authorized. 3
Fifteen years ago, the Court stated that "ihere
can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a
man gdts depends on the amount Qf money he
has." 4 The rationale in Tate could be paraphrased
!'there can be no equal justice when the kind of
1399 U.S. 235 (1970). Williams, *an indigent, was
convicted of petty theft and given the maximum sen-
tence of one year in jail and a fine of $500 and was
assessed S5 in court costs. Because he was not able to
pay the fine and costs, he was given an additional 101
days in jail.
2401 U.S. 395 (1971).
3 Tate, an indigent, was fined a total of $425 for
traffic offenses. The fines were imposed by the munic-
ipal court of Houston, Texas, whose jurisdiction was
limited to the imposition of fines not exceeding 8200
for any offense. Tate could not afford to pay the fines
and was committed to the municipal prison farm to
work off the amount at the rate of $5 per day. By this
roundabout method, a court without jurisdiction to
impose a jail term sentenced Tate to 85 days in jail
for offenses subject to "fine only" penalties.
4 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956). This
decision required Illinois to furnish indigents free
transcripts on appeals.
punishment a man gets depends on the amount
of money he has." s
Tate was given an 85 day jail term when he
could not afford to pay his statutory fines. After
three weeks in custody, he applied to the county
criminal court for a writ of habeas corpus, which
the court denied. The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed in two short paragraphs.6 That
court
... overrule[d] appellant's contention that be-
cause he is too poor to pay the fines his imprison-
ment is unconstitutional. His status as an indi-
gent does not render this petitioner immune from
criminal prosecution.
The United States Supreme Court reversed on
the authority of Williams v. Illinois.8 The Court
did not decide that Tate's indigency rendered
him immune from prosecution. Rather it held
that his indigency could not subject him to im-
prisonment for a "fine only" offense.
5This observation was made by Judge Edgerton
eleven years ago in his dissenting opinion in Wildeblood
v. United States, 284 F.2d 592 (D.C. Cir. 1960). His
precise statement was, "Few would care to say there
can be equal justice where the kind of punishment a
man gets depends on the amount of money he has."
Id. at 594.
6 Ex parte Tate, 445 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. Crim. App.
1969).7 Id. at 211.
9 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
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The earlier Williams decision, interpreted nar-
rowly, merely prevented the imprisonment of one
unable to pay a fine for - total period exceeding
the maximum statutory term for the offense.
Chief Justice Burger was careful to point out in
the opinion that the holding was not to curtail
the sentencing prerogatives of the trial judge. The
Chief Justice cautioned
... our holding does not deal with a judgment
of confinement for nonpayment of a fine in the
familiar pattern of alternative sentence of '$30
or 30 days.' We hold only that a State may not
constitutionally imprison beyond the maximum
duration fixed by statute a defendant who is fi-
nancially unable to pay a fine.9
Tate v. Short extends the Williams prohibition
to instances in which the offender is unable to
satisfy his fine by an immediate lump sum pay-
ment. On its facts, Tate forbids imprisonment of
the indigent offender in cases where a fine is the
only punishment prescribed by statute, but its
holding should not be limited to "fine only" situa-
tions. The reasoning behind Tate is well expressed
by Justice White in his concurring opinion in
Morris v. Schoonfield'0 where he declared
... the same constitutional defect condemned
in Williams also inheres in jailing an indigent for
failing to make immediate payment of any fine
whether or not the fine is accompanied by a jail
term and whether or not the jail term of the indi-
gent extends beyond the maximum term that may
be imposed on a person willing and able to pay
a fine. In each case, the Constitution prohibits
the State from imposing a fine as a sentence and
then automatically converting it into a jail term
solely because the defendant is indigent and can-
not forthwith pay the fine in full."
This argument was expressly adopted by the Court
in Tate v. Short.1
2
Some courts, before the Tate decision, inter-
preted Williams to apply only to situations in
9 Id. at 243. The Court pointed out that this decision
also applies to court costs assessed against the defen-
dant. Id. at 244 n.20.
10 In this case, decided in the interim between Wil-
liains and Tate, the defendant was imprisoned immedi-
ately after sentencing for his inability to pay the entire
fine forthwith. The Supreme Court vacated the judg-
ment in a brief per curiam decision on the authority of
Williams and in the light of intervening Maryland
legislation, allowing the trial judge, in his discretion, to
provide for installment payment of the fine. 399 U.S.
508 (1970).
11 Id. at 509 (White, J., concurring).
12 401 U.S. at 398.
which the statutory maximum prison term would
be exceeded by the addition of a "days for dollars"
sentence. The California Supreme Court correctly
interpreted Williams and anticipated Tate in
In Re Antazo13 when it concluded
that [Antazo's] imprisonment because of his ina-
bility, due solely to his indigency, to pay the fine
... constituted an invidious discrimination
based on his poverty in violation of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.?4
The Tate and Williams decisions join with many
commentators in condemning the practice of
jailing indigents for non-payment of fines.' 5 No
one would at this date openly advocate immediate
jailing of such offenders, but as will be seen, the
alternatives suggested so far leave much to be
desired.
The alternative most often suggested is the
"deferred payment" scheme under which the
indigent offender is given the chance to satisfy
his fine in installments. 6 Several states have
enacted legislation authorizing deferred or install-
ment payment of fines.Y The New York law8 is
3 3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P.2d 999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255
(1970).
11 Id. at 105, 473 P.2d at 1001, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 257.
5 See, e.g., S. RuBni, H. WEIRO EN, G. EDWARDS
& S. ROSENZWEIG, TuE LAW OF CRMM~AL CORRECTION
253 (1963); E. SUTHERLAND & D. CIESSEY, PRINCIPLES
OF CRMINOLOGY 276 (1960); Comment, Fines, hn-
prisonnient, and the Poor: "Thirty Dollars or Thirty
Days," 57 CALIF. L. REv. 778, 780-87 (1969); Derelop-
inents-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1067
(1968); Comment, Equal Protection and the Use of
Fines as Penalties for Criminal Offenses, 1966 U. ILL.
L.F. 460, 463-66; Note, The Equal Protection Clause and
Imprisonment of the Indigent for Nonpayment of Fines,
64 MICH. L. REv. 938, 945-47 (1966).
1 See Note, Discriminations Against the Poor and the
Fourteenth Anendiuent, 81 HARv. L. REv. 448 (1967);
Note, supra note 15, 64 Micr. L. REv. at 938; Note,
Fines and Fining-An Evaluation, 101 U. Pa. L. REv.
1022 (1953).
17 CAL. PENAL CODE S 1205 (West 1970) (misde-
meanors only); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4332 (c)
(Supp. 1968); MD..ANN. CODE art. 38, § 4 (a) (2)
(Supp. 1970); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § IA
(1959); N. Y. CODF. CRrm. P. § 470-d (1) (b) (Mclzin-
ney Supp. 1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 953 (1964);
WAsu. Rv. CODE ANN. § 9.92.070 (1961).
a1 In any case where the defendant is unable to pay
a fine imposed by the court, the defendant may
at any time apply to the court for resentence. In
such case, if the court is satisfied that the de-
fendant is unable to pay the fine, the court
must, notwithstanding any other provision of
law, revoke the entire sentence imposed and
must resentence the defendant. Upon such
resentence, the court may impose any sentence
it originally could have imposed except that
the amount of any fine imposed shall not be in
[Vol. 62
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by far the most liberal, requiring the court to
impose no fine greater than what the offender is
able to pay. 9 While such laws are a step in the right
direction, they provide no viable alternative to
those indigents who cannot afford to pay a fine at
any time, whether at the time the fine is imposed
or six months or a year later.
It has been suggested that in this event, the
fine be remitted.ss This solution is no solution at
all. Equal protection of the laws obviously does
not require, or even permit that the poorest
offenders go unpunished 'while those able to pay
their fines suffer the consequences. 2' The Supreme
Court has made this clear by declaring
The State is not powerless to enforce judgments
against those financially unable to pay a fine;
indeed, a different result would amount to in-
verse discrimination since it would enable an indi-
gent to avoid both the fine and imprisonment for
nonpayment whereas other defendants must al-
ways suffer one or the other conviction. 22
A second alternative, doing away with fines
entirely, has also been proposed. This would
punish all offenders, rich or poor, by jail terms for
all offenses2 3 Justice Blackmun seems to agree with
this suggestion in his concurring opinion in Tate.Y
The indigent would still be imprisoned, as he was
before Williams and Tate, but the offender able
to pay the fine, who would be sufficiently punished
and deterred by the fine alone, would suffer the
excess of the amount the defendant is able to
pay.
N.Y. CoDE C-m. P. § 470--d (3) (McKinney
Supp. 1970).
19This assertion holds true for "fine only" offenses,
but since the law authorizes the court to resentence the
offender and impose "any sentence it originally could
have imposed.. ." id., there is some fear that, at least
for offenses subject to a "days or dollars" penalty,
that an indigent would be given a jail term at the
resentencing. See Comment, supra note 15, 57 CAIT.
L. REv. at 778. If this proves true, then the New York
law does not solve the problem Tate presents, i.e.,
what to do with the offender who cannot afford to pay
a fine.
20 See Comment, supra note 15, 57 CALrF. L. REv.
at 820.
21 This is the problem of "inverse discrimination"
referred to by the Supreme Court in Williams, 399
U.S. at 244-45, and again in Tate, 401 U.S. at 395. See
text accompanying notes 22-26 infra.2 Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244-45 (1970).
23 See Note, supra note 16, 81 HARv. L. REv., at 448.
24Justice Blackmun's opinion should probably be
restricted to situations concerning traffic offenses,
since his main concern seems to be with highway ac-
cidents. To attribute advocacy of "jail only " punish-
ment across the board to his concurring opinion would
be unwarranted.
harsher penalty of a jail term.25 This alternative
would cost both rich and poor a period of lost
freedom, but only the rich or middle-class offender
would suffer the further damage of lost earnings.2r
Thus a "jail only" alternative would impose
greater punishment on the non-indigent offender,
and the equal protection objection which forbids
imprisonment of indigents in Tate should apply to
prevent the imposition of unequal punishment on
the offender who is willing and able to pay a fine.
A "jail only" policy would also constitute a rejec-
tion of the implicit legislative"7 or judicial28 deter-
24 If Williams and Tate are defensible, it must be
assumed that a jail term is a more severe penalty
than a fine. Otherwise, were the penalties equivalent
even though different in kind, jailing the indigent
would not violate the equal protection clause.
26 For an outright rejection of this alternative, sce
State v. Tackett, __ Hawaii -, 483 P.2d 191 (1971).
21 A.statutorily regulated criminal penalty implies a
legislative judgment as to the correctness of the penalty
for the given offense. This is true whether the legis-
lature has restricted the penalty to the imposition of
fine only, imprisonment only, or both. In any event,
it must be presumed that the lawmakers have weighed
the gravity of the offense, and the measure of both
retribution and rehabilitation or deterrence to be
demanded by the state from one committing a specific
offense. If the legislature has decided thai one year's
imprisonment is the maximum sentence called for by
an offense, as in Williams, then it is not for the courts
to impose a longer sentence under the guise of fine.
The same is true in the case where the legislature has
determined that a fine only shall be the maximum pen-
alty due the State for an offense.
21 The above is also true when it is the court, rather
than the legislature, which determines a particular
penalty to be sufficient. See S. RumN, spra note 15,
at 254:
If the punishment authorized for a crime per-
mits either fine or imprisonment and in a partic-
ular case the court selects the former, it
has thereby decided that fine rather than im-
prisonment is the appropriate method of treat-
ing the offender. Subsequent use of imprison-
ment to enforce the fine, whether for punish-
ment or for collection, vitiates the previous fun-
damental decision to deal with the offender by
fine. When a fine is imposed, it is tantamount to
a declaration that neither the safety of the com-
munity nor the welfare of the offender requires
the imprisonment of the offender. If the offender
does not have the present means of paying a fine,
the court should have this, as well as other rele-
vant information, prior to the sentence. If the
court nevertheless imposes a fine as sole punish-
ment, the intent may have been that payment be
made out of future earnings, but certainly that
the fine is the appropriate sanction. Imprisonment
for default would defeat such intent. If thA defend-
ant cannot pay a fine and the court, neverthe-
less, fines him and orders his imprisonment
for default, it has in effect passed a sentence of
imprisonment; the fine is mere window dressing.
Thus failure to pay a fine by an offender should
not routinely lead to jailing; the ultimate sanc-
tion to be used in any fining case should not de-
19711
INDIGENT DEFENDANT-STA TUTORY FINES
mination that some offenses are suitably punished
solely by fines.
There is yet another objection to a "jail only"
alternative. In Williams v. Illinois, the argument
was made that the State had a substantial and
legitimate interest in collecting fines as a part of
its collection of revenue, and that a "work off"
system 9 was a rational means of implementing
that policy." The Court rejected this argument in
Williams,31 and later stated that while imprison-
ment
is imposed to augment the State's revenues fit]
obviously does not serve that purpose; the
defendant can't pay because he is indigent and his
imprisonment, rather than aid collection of the
revenue, saddles the State with the cost of feeding
and housing him for the period of his imprison-
ment. 2
The jail only alternative to imprisonment for
nonpayment of fines is neither practical nor sensi-
ble.3"
Another suggested alternative is the so-called
"day fine" or "proportional fine." 14 Under this
plan, fines would be tailored to suit each offender,
much the same as the graduated income tax. This
alternative also poses problems. As the ingenious
millionaire can show a loss for a tax year, he could
by the same token avoid the amount of fine he
should otherwise pay. On the other hand, this
method offers no solution for the very poor offender
who cannot pay any fine at all. The determination
of the amount of fine the court should impose
would bring problems. A small local court might
be unable to handle this added burden. In any
event, if the offender is allowed to question the
court's determination, as has been suggested,3 an
pend upon the default alone, but upon the opti-
mum corrective course.
See also E. SUTHERLAND & D. CREASEY, PRLCIPLES OF
CRIMINOLOGY 276 (1960).
211n other words, "working off" the fine through
imprisonment at the rate of X dollars for each day.
20 399 U.S. at 238.
.1 Id. at 238-39.
32 Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. at 399.
For a whole-hearted support of fines as eminently
preferable substitute for short-term imprisonment,
see H. MANNHEIM, GROUP PROBLEMS IW CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT 246 1955), and Note suepra note 16,
81 HARv. L. REV., at 435.
34 See, e.g., Note, supra note 16, 81 HARv. L. REV.,
at 435; Comment, supra note 15, 1966 U. ILL. L.F., at
466; Note, supra note 16, 101 U. PA. L. REv., at 1013.
See also Comment, supra note 15, 57 CA.. L. REv.,
at 778.
30 See Comment, supra note 15, 57 CALYm. L. REv.,
at 815.
evidentiary hearing, possible state-provided coun-
sel, and perhaps an appeal procedure would un-
reasonably extend what was once a short and
simple "30 days or $30." This administrative
inconvenience which would be required by the
"proportional fine" alternative would seem by
itself to eliminate the idea from further considera-
tion, and the problem of the offender too poor to
pay anything at all seals its coffin.
Still another alternative is the "work-release"
program under which the offender is held in
custody each night and released each day, if he is
employed, to go to work. Of all the suggested
alternatives, this is closest to the imprisonment
forbidden by the Williams and Tate decisions.
Perhaps if a "jail only" policy were adopted, a
"work release" program would meet the inverse
discrimination objection by allowing offenders who
could have paid a fine to continue their occupations
so as not to suffer the added penalty of lost earn-
ings. As an alternative in itself, however, a "work
release" program is unsatisfactory because under
it the rich would pay a fine and the indigent would
be imprisoned, even if only at night.
There are other as yet unchampioned alterna-
tives, but each presents greater difficulties than
do those examined above. Courts do, on occasion
impose penalties peculiarly tailored for the of-
fense. 6 Perhaps on some occasions the court facing
the problem of how to punish an indigent offender
could devise a suitable penalty. For instance,
certain traffic offenses may be "punished" by
requiring the offender to attend a remedial driver
education course. Many courts, however, may not
be sufficiently inventive to fashion such penalties,
and many offenses, such as trespass and assault,
would be inappropriate for unique penalties. In
any event, the objection is still present that the
rich can pay the fine while the poor must comply
with whatever tailor-made penalty the court may
impose, or go to jail. At best, this alternative to a
jail term could have only limited usefulness.
A further suggestion concerns the "work off"
rate question raised by Williams' attorneys against
the State of Illinois." During the course of that
appeal, the argument was made that the rate of
$5 for each day of imprisonment was unreasonable
36 For example, consider the punishment imposed on
a youthful flag desecrator by Judge Frank Thomasello
in Cambridge, Massachusetts. In lieu of six months in
the House of Correction, the offender carried the flag
"through the streets of Cambridge to Harvard Square.-
Chicago Daily News, Nov. 18, 1970, at 58, col. 1.
" Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. at 238.
[Vol. 62
